

what we can do to say, well, how do we need to save money in Medicare, let us also look at what impact that will have on our own constituents, on our own family. By living to 84 years, that is successful. He is a product of the benefits of our system, Medicare. His father did not have Medicare when he passed away in the late 1940s. We need to remember that. The better quality of life for our senior citizens, they have paid their dues, the World War II generation that my dad is part of. Let us remember those folks, that they are the ones that this was created for. It was created for that. Let us not forget those folks that are still providing for our country, that we want to make sure that they will have Medicare and a good Medicare program when they retire.

Mr. PALLONE. I just wanted to follow up on what my colleague from Florida said also about low-income people, low-income seniors not being aware and therefore not applying for some of the low-income protection programs like the QMB or the SLMB programs that we have. Under Medicare and Medicaid, if you are below a certain income, you can apply through Medicaid so that you actually get certain prescription drugs covered and certain other benefits covered. But one of the things that is in this Older Women's League report that I mentioned for Mother's Day is that half the elderly women who are eligible for those low-income protection programs never apply for them because they are not aware of them. And also because they do not want to go to the welfare offices where they have to go from what I understand in order to get them because they do not want to be part of a welfare program. One of the reforms that was suggested by OWL is that individuals be able to apply directly through Medicare or Social Security for those low-income protection benefits. Again that is a kind of reform that we should be looking at, something that is going to help people with prescription drugs and some of these other protections rather than worrying about how we are going to save money by raising the age of eligibility.

Mr. DEUTSCH. I just want to quickly mention, because I think what the gentleman said is really important, sort of almost as a public service announcement for whoever is watching us this evening, that there are benefits in Medicare that unfortunately not enough people take advantage of. We have put into Medicare some preventive coverage. Mammogram screening. Right now less than 50 percent of Medicare beneficiaries who are eligible for it take advantage of it. It is free, with no copayment, no deductible. We really need to push that, because that also has its positive humanitarian, human side, preventing one but also the monetary side as well.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Preventive care for prostate cancer, for breast cancer, for osteoporosis, for diabetes, a whole host of new preventive care programs paid for by Medicare all in the last 2 or 3 years. That is something people should certainly take advantage of.

Mr. PALLONE. Those were put in as a result or with the balanced budget process.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OSE). The Chair would remind the Members to direct their comments to the chair and not to the members or viewing audience outside the Chamber.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. In closing, I think, Mr. Speaker, the commitment for all of us, all four of us that have been here tonight, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DEUTSCH), the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GREEN), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE) is start with the 15 percent budget surplus, put it in Medicare, put those over the next half dozen, dozen years, hundreds of billions of dollars into Medicare. The trust fund already is solid until 2015.

□ 2200

We can even do better than that. Make sure the preventive care is explained as well as the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DEUTSCH) did, and we continue to talk about that, and expand Medicare 55 to 64, and especially programs like prescription drugs.

I thank my colleagues for joining us tonight.

DISCUSSION ON KOSOVO

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. MCINNIS) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, I would note that I will be happy to yield to the gentlewoman from the Committee on Rules when the time is appropriate.

Mr. Speaker, good evening.

I am pleased that I have an opportunity to visit with all of my colleagues this evening about an issue that is very dear to my heart, an issue that I am going to spend the next, say, 45 or 50 minutes talking to you on several different areas that I think we should review, an issue that is not only dear to my heart but dear to everybody's heart that is sitting on this floor.

As my colleagues know, I have never been at a stage in life where I had children that were of the age that could now serve in the military. My wife, Lori, and I are very privileged to have three children: Daxon, Daxon is 22 years old; Tessa, who is 21 years old; and Andrea, who is 17 years old. As my colleagues can guess, my concern today is about the military action that is being taken in that land far away called Kosovo or Yugoslavia.

I thought we would start out by covering several points. I want to give you just somewhat of a brief history, talk about what are the real interests of the United States.

At this point in time, Mr. Speaker, I would be happy, so that we could go ahead and take care of the rule, to yield to the gentlewoman for the rule.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1664, KOSOVO AND SOUTHWEST ASIA EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999

Mrs. MYRICK, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 106-127) on the resolution (H. Res. 159) providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1664) making emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations, refugee relief, and humanitarian assistance relating to the conflict in Kosovo, and for military operations in Southwest Asia for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. MCINNIS. Mr. Speaker, well, we will go back to the Kosovo discussion, but I do, first of all, want to acknowledge the Committee on Rules.

As my colleagues can see, it is after 10 o'clock at night back here in the East, and that Committee on Rules is still working hard. They put in a lot of late hours, and I know they are appreciated by the Members on this floor.

Let us go back to my outline about what I am going to discuss this evening on Kosovo and Yugoslavia.

First of all, we are going to talk a little on the brief history, just give you summary.

I am not a historian, I am not a teacher or a professor, so I am not going to go into great detail, but I do want to summarize kind of the scenario or the historical perspective that I think is important for me to get to the other points of this speech. We are going to talk about what are the interests of the United States.

As my colleagues know, before the United States enters any type of military action, we need to define, we need to have a clear interpretation and a clear definition of why it is that we are doing what we are doing, what is it about the authority. Do you have the authority to invade the sovereign territory of another country? Under what conditions does that authority exist, and do we meet those conditions?

Talk about what the European responsibility is in this situation, what the cost is to the American taxpayers, and I think you will be surprised by the numbers that I give you this evening as to what it is going to cost the American taxpayers to complete this action over the next 2 to 3 years.

We should talk about the humanitarian effort. Clearly, no matter where you fall on the side of the policy that is now being followed by this country

in regards to Kosovo, we can all agree on one thing, and that is that there is a just cause for a humanitarian effort. We will talk a little bit about the humanitarian effort.

We will also talk about the deployment of ground troops. I have read the press lately, I have read and been briefed and so on that there is an urge to put ground troops in over there. Let us talk a little about that this evening.

What are the logistics involved? What do ground troops really mean? What kind of numbers of ground troops are we going to have to have to go into this situation, not just to keep the peace, but do we ever stand a chance of making the peace? And tonight my colleagues will see that I distinguish between keeping the peace and making the peace.

We will talk a little bit about NATO, what the military facts are of NATO, and I want to visit about what I think how this conflict will probably end, what my best guess is, what the wild card is. We know what the wild card is out there. We are going to talk a little more about the Russians; that is the key, that is the wild card; talk about the refugee problem, and of course we will emphasize our support for the troops.

But let us talk a little about and let us look first at the map and talk a little bit about the history.

This is Yugoslavia, just an outline right here.

To give you an example, right there where the red dot is, that is Belgrade. Probably as we are speaking, as I am speaking right now, there are bombing missions or sorties being taken over the community or the city of Belgrade.

The important region down here, this is Kosovo, right here where I am circling with the red dot. That is called Kosovo.

The reason that I brought the map is that my colleagues need to understand there are some individuals who are talking about an occupation of this portion of Yugoslavia. By going in there with a military force some have even suggested a partition, partition out this area called Kosovo away from the sovereign mother country of Yugoslavia.

What is key about that is to remember that in any country and with any of us sitting in these Chambers one of the things of which we have the strongest fundamental views about is our religion. This is a key issue here. Remember that in Yugoslavia the Serbs, many of the monuments of their religion, the birthplace of their religion, is in this very territory down here that some people are suggesting to separate from the main country and to put under some type of partition or under some type of occupation by a foreign force.

That is a key issue, to see whether we can resolve it by the occupation,

and that is how are you going to address this religious difference? What are you going to say to those people? What are you going to say to the Serbs, the Serb citizens, by the way, not the leadership, but the Serbs and the citizens of Yugoslavia, that they cannot go down to the territory and visit their religious monuments. It is a point we ought to remember.

Remember that in this country, and we have left the map now. We probably will not have to come back to where we may come back a little later on to talk about Macedonia and Albania and so on. But the history of this country, I have heard many people talk about this is a genocide. I have no disagreement with these individuals when we talk about the tragedies that are going on, but I want to point out that this is different than Hitler.

I have seen a lot of comparisons to Hitler. There are atrocities, but remember the atrocities and the historical perspective have occurred on both sides. We are in between two bad characters.

Now I am not talking about the innocent citizens of the country. I am talking about the leaders of the KLA, the Kosovo liberation organization, and I am talking about Milosevic and Yugoslavia, the leaders, the dictators, over in that country. They are both bad characters.

And when we talk about the genocide, that would infer a Hitler type of situation where we went to an innocent population, the Jewish population. They were not engaged in a civil war. He just wiped them out because they were Jewish.

In this particular country there is killing going on in both sides. It has been for hundreds of years. Take a look at the history 1389. The Serbs and the Turks engaged in the battle over the disputed territory here in Kosovo. In Yugoslavia, the Serbs lost that battle, but to this day they still celebrate it as a holiday.

This conflict has lots of history. This conflict has guilty parties, so to speak, on all sides.

I am going to talk a little more extensively about the KLA as we get into it, but what we are intervening in here is not a genocide. We are intervening in a war of which we know very little about, a civil war. To me, it makes as much sense as having the Mexican Army come across the borders of the United States to try and resolve the battle between the North and the South. How well do you think that would have gone over? What did the Mexican Army really understand about the conflict between the North and the South? What does the United States really understand on the historical conflict in Yugoslavia?

I think our understanding is limited. I think their understanding, it is their home territory, it is their religion, it is

a battle that has been going on for a long time.

Take a look at the historical perspective of the United States. How successful have we been in our history when we have intervened in the civil war of another country? We have never been successful in that kind of intervention.

Now there are times, if you get a mass of enough force, that we are able to step between two warring parties; for example, Cyprus. On the island of Cyprus we have something called the green line. It is the line that separates the Greeks from the Turks. We have been there for 27 years under the auspices of the United Nations. Have we made the peace between the Greeks and the Turks? No. We stood between them. We have kept them apart from each other.

What will happen in my opinion the day that we will pull U.N. forces or American forces or a peacekeeping force out from between these parties? They are going to go back to doing what they have done for a long, long time. In my opinion, they do not like each other any better today than they did 30 years ago when we put the green line in. So the green line is able to keep peace between the parties as long as we are willing to continue this long-term commitment, but they have never made peace between the parties.

Is the United States or NATO going to be able to make the peace between these parties?

You will note during my conversation that I keep referring to the United States. Well, the United States is, in fact, operating under the auspices of NATO. But take a look at what the proportions are. The United States by far is carrying a minimum of 90 percent, in my opinion, a minimum of 90 percent of the cost, 90 percent of the forces, 90 percent of the bombs, 90 percent of the equipment. So when I talk about the United States, I understand that this is a NATO operation. But I also think it is fair for us to determine what proportion the United States is carrying, and I think it is also fair for us to explain to the American people, whom I think already know, that the United States by far has the heaviest weight on their shoulders.

Well, is the United States going to be able to go into this country, into this dispute that involves hundreds of years of history, that involves religion, that involves atrocities on both sides? Is the United States militarily going to be able to go in and make the peace? I do not think so. Is the United States willing to go in and give the kind of long-term, expensive commitment, expensive not just in dollars but, even more importantly, in human lives to try and keep the peace? I do not know. I do not think so once we have a clear understanding of just how difficult this will be and what the small chances of success are.

Now I do, as I mentioned earlier, believe that the United States has a very clear role from a humanitarian aspect. As my colleagues know, that is one of the things we can be awful proud about in this country. I am darn proud to be an American. I am very, very proud of our forefathers, of our children and of the obligations that this country voluntarily takes on to help people in need. This country's greatness is in part built on our humanitarian efforts throughout history for other countries, but there is a large difference between humanitarian effort and the military effort.

Let me talk about the next issue that I think we need to talk about, and what are the interests of the United States? Of course, the United States, we are God-loving people. We are people who, generally, we do believe in peace. We oppose oppression. The question here is, how do we distinguish between an action in Yugoslavia and, say, an action in the Sudan or Rwanda?

Now granted Sudan and Rwanda are not on the CNN news every hour or every half an hour and have not been for the last several months, but I can tell you that the atrocities that are being committed in those countries greatly exceed the atrocities that were being committed in Yugoslavia before we started the invasion.

In fact, you will see that the punishment being dealt up unfairly in Yugoslavia to the Albanians, to the Kosovo Albanians, was actually much, much less prior to the NATO invasion, much, much less than any of these other countries, but the United States must make a very conscious decision on where the interests of this country are that are necessary for us to enter into a conflict.

□ 2215

One of them is we do not like to see people being killed. We do not like it anywhere. We value human life at the very highest of the rungs on the ladder. It is supreme to us, human life. But we cannot be the world's police officer. We cannot go to Rwanda tomorrow. We cannot go to Sudan.

The question is: What is the difference here? Why are we over there in Yugoslavia? What justifies that any more than acting or failing to act in the Sudan or in Rwanda? Is it a national security interest? Is the Yugoslav Army capable of a military threat to the continental United States? The answer is, no.

Is it a threat to the European continent? I have heard over and over and over again about how this is going to spread throughout Europe; this is how the world war started. It is not how World War I started by the way. And this is going to lead to World War III if we do not quickly get in there and contain this situation.

I disagree with that very, very strongly. I do not see this as a threat

to the European continent, meaning that it is going to flow throughout its borders and create a war on the European continent. If, in fact, that is true, the Europeans ought to frankly pick up a little heavier load on this particular mission.

Maybe the Europeans ought to handle the military aspect of this mission and let the United States handle the humanitarian aspect of it.

I frankly do not think the Europeans are carrying their fair share of the load here. Once again, it is the good old United States that is carrying the load. So we do not have a national security threat; we do not have a threat to the European continent. Do we have an economic, a world economic threat? Do we have even a more specific economic threat as a result of the actions occurring in Yugoslavia? The answer to that is, no, as well.

Once we address what kind of interests that we have, then we have to address how do we get out of it? What is the exit strategy? What is the end game? Do we have one here?

I think it is very confusing out there. I think NATO is confused by it. I think the American public is confused about it. I can talk to any one of my colleagues out here and I do not think any one of us have a unified exit strategy.

Now what are we going to do? That question keeps coming up, now what are we going to do? Where do we go from this point? How well did we think out the fact that hundreds of thousands of refugees would be coming across these borders; in fact, the possibility of creating now a political upheaval in some of these other countries?

We have to figure out what our national interests are. I have a pretty simple test to do that. I think that before the United States puts our young men and women in harm's way, we need to, as elected officials, as representatives of the people of this country, we have an awesome responsibility, we have a fiduciary responsibility, to the people of this country, before we commit those young people to harm's way, I think we need to do this test, and this is how I do it, this is the burden I put upon myself: Can I look to the parents of one of these young people right in the eye and tell them that the loss of the life of their young child was necessitated by the best interests of this country, that this young person giving the ultimate supreme sacrifice, their life, was necessary to protect the national interest of the United States of America?

My own feeling, my own deep personal belief, I do not think we can meet that standard. I cannot meet that standard because I fail to see what are the national interests.

As I mentioned earlier, clearly there are atrocities, and I do not want a misinterpretation coming here, there are atrocities that are being committed.

The question is, what role should the United States play? I think the role of the United States would much better be defined and much easier justified and would fall within the realm of our national interests for us to carry out the humanitarian mission, not to be the 90 percent partner, 90 percent partner, on a military action; 90 percent meaning we pick up the bulk of it.

Now we have heard some people say, well, yes but the United States just has the heavy load on the beginning. Then as this action proceeds, the other members of NATO will pitch in and carry their fair share, but the United States really needs to carry the burden because they have the equipment, they have the soldiers, they have the money.

I can say this, Mr. Speaker, in my opinion, with all due respect to our European colleagues, they are going to sit back and say, hey, let the United States do it; let the taxpayers of the United States pay for it; let the United States put its troops in harm's way; let the United States supply the airplanes; let the United States supply the arsenals; let the United States go in and rebuild what the United States has bombed; let the United States put in what I think is going to be necessary, a miniature Marshall Plan to rebuild all of the destruction and try and create some kind of an economy over there if, in fact, we can get the refugees back in there.

This partnership ratio, in my opinion, is not going to change as long as we sit on our hands and are content with carrying 18 other partners, with us carrying 90 percent of the load. It should not work that way. This is a partnership.

So we need to figure out, do we have national interests that, in fact, dictate, mandate, require, that we enter into a military action? Well, we certainly did not going into it. I would love to debate any one of my colleagues, anybody in here, to really justify it. Now, remember, we have a humanitarian mission justified but a military mission, based on the history of this country, based on our lack of success, this country's lack of success in the intervention of any civil war, I would like to debate whether we have that national interest going in.

Now, of course, the question arises, has the national interest been created now that we are in? Should we just drop NATO? Does it hurt the alliance, the defense alliance, for the United States to all of a sudden stop operations?

Well, there is a debate there, and that is a logical question to ask. It is a question I do not fully know the answer to, but I do think that the United States can step forward without jeopardizing the alliance, the importance of the NATO alliance. I am a NATO supporter as far as the concept of that alliance.

I do not think we jeopardize that alliance at all for us to step up to our European neighbors and say, hey, the balance is going to change here; you are going to start to carry a heavier burden on your shoulders, European colleagues, European partners, and we are going to start to focus more on the humanitarian effort. That kind of shift, in my opinion, needs to take place.

Let us talk about the legal authority. Remember what we had here in Yugoslavia? See the red dot there? What is that following? There is a little tiny line. That little tiny line is what humans have decided to use as a designation of what? Of a border, of a boundary. Someone wants to find a border, as a line drawn in the sand, to see how close they could get to it without going on to the other side of it.

Well, that is what this is. This is a sovereign country. Every party involved in this conflict acknowledges that this right here, Yugoslavia, it is a sovereign country and that to go into the region called Kosovo, borders have to be crossed; the sovereign territory of another country has to be crossed.

NATO has never gone, without invitation, across a sovereign territory of another country, but they did this time.

Now remember not too many years ago the Persian Gulf War? Remember the quotes from our leaders back then? How could Iraq possibly think it is a violation of international law for Iraq to invade the sovereign territory of Kuwait? So the United States went to war with Iraq because Iraq violated that boundary, a boundary very similar to this in definition; violated that boundary, invaded a sovereign country.

So the United States, justifiably I might add, went to war to push Iraq back across this sovereign territory. Once the United States pushed Iraq back out of Kuwait and back into its own boundaries, the United States ceased the action because the theory of the action was simply to defend the sovereign nation, not exclusively but somewhat simply to defend those boundaries of Kuwait.

What kind of precedent do we set by allowing NATO to invade the sovereign territory of Yugoslavia and maybe even carve out a part of the country and say we are taking this part of the country from them? What kind of precedent do we set?

What happens, for example, if Quebec, in its effort to seek independence, decides to secede from Canada? Does that give the United States justification to bomb Canada? How are we going to address that. That is not a far-fetched scenario.

What if some of the people in Mexico want Texas either to be independent or go back to Mexico? Does that give Mexico the right to bomb the United States?

Sure, a lot of people who are very supportive of the action, the military

action, who say do not dare question the policy of the administration, they will say this does not compare, but I am saying, and I put out there to all of my colleagues the question, think about it, try and think historically where we have been successful in a civil war; try and think of other factors or other similar situations in the country, like in the world, like Quebec and Canada, and ask the questions what if, what kind of precedent, what kind of history are we setting with the action that we have undertaken?

Let us move on. I have talked about what I think the European responsibility is. I think that a lot of our colleagues, a lot of our partners in NATO, need to pick up a bigger load. I have said that repeatedly during my comments but it does bear repeating again. The United States is a good guy. It is a good country. It is a great country. We truly have been the leaders of the free world for a long time.

I think our country is very capable and I think our country has a responsibility on humanitarian aid when we see tragedies, by the way on both sides of this conflict, tragedies on both sides of this conflict, we have a humanitarian responsibility.

How do we measure out just how much weight we put in the backpack that the United States is expected to carry compared to the Europeans?

I frankly think a lot of our partners in NATO are getting a free ride. It is not their planes that are at substantial risk. Take a look at the money that this country will pay now.

Speaking of money, and we are going to talk about cost here in a minute, remember there are lots of ways to shift numbers about but when we get to the bottom line, the bottom line is this is an action by the United States of America. The United States is going to pay a bigger part of it, and I think it is time to have another partnership meeting. I think in that partnership meeting it is time to say to our partners that they are going to have to carry a larger share of the burden here. We are happy to help on the humanitarian effort but from a military point of view, they have to participate more; they have to take a bigger chunk of this.

When I talk about military, I am not just talking about the bombing raids, the missions, the sorties we are carrying out over there. I am talking about the time after. Once this thing reaches a cease-fire, and I think it will at some point reach a cease-fire, I am talking about rebuilding that territory that has been destroyed by NATO bombs, or by the Yugoslavia Army. How is that rebuilt and whose obligation is it then? Is it once again going to be 90 percent of the United States of America? I propose that it probably will be, unless we have an administration and a Congress that is strong in saying to NATO, look, to rebuild this,

to put in a mini Marshall Plan, there are other countries that are going to have to participate in a very substantial way.

The United States cannot be expected to spend a hundred billion dollars at a minimum to put this country back on track.

Let us talk about the cost because I just mentioned a hundred billion dollars. I mentioned that earlier in my comments. Now I am putting aside the cost of human lives. Obviously the most painful, the most regrettable and the toughest cost out there is the loss of a human life.

With all due respect, we lost two of our military people last night in a helicopter accident. We had our first two fatalities in this action. I regret those losses and to me they are, and to I am sure every colleague I have here, republican and democrat, it is a loss that is substantial to us. Every time we lose a human life in an action like this, it is a substantial loss.

Let us talk not about that cost, but let us talk about the dollars. For a moment let us talk about the less important cost, which is the dollars; let us just go to that category and talk about it. Are we in this country prepared to spend at least a hundred billion, billion not million, billion dollars on this action?

□ 2230

That is what I think it is going to cost.

Let us talk about the cost for a minute. I estimate, and now, there are lots of accounting shifts that go on out there in government books. They will say, there is a carrier out there, for example, that we have assigned to this mission, but we do not really assign the costs of the carrier to this action because we would have had to pay for this carrier to be somewhere, anyway. So we do not add this up.

There are all kinds of little tricks that go on. Some of them are legitimate, so maybe the word "tricks" is not correct, maybe "maneuvers." There is all kinds of maneuvering that goes on to allocate these costs in different slots.

The fact is, I think if we looked at a true cost accounting of what this action is incurring, I would say it is about \$1 billion a week, \$1 billion a week. Tomorrow on this House floor we are going to have a very healthy debate on supplementing, on the first down payment or one of the first down payments to pay for this project.

The expense is not just, as I mentioned earlier, our military mission. When the bombs stop falling, this deal is not over. In fact, we just signed on to a long-term contract. One of the first things that will be demanded is that America, is that the United States, through the auspices of NATO or some other organization, perhaps they will

bring the United Nations into this, has an obligation to rebuild, to go in there and build those bridges, to go in there and build an economy.

Remember, these refugees who have left this country, why have they left the country? One, because of NATO bombs; two, because of the Yugoslavian army and the slaughter that is going on over there as a result of a wartime action, now; three, their bridges have been destroyed, their drinking water has been contaminated, they do not have any communication abilities, they do not have heating capabilities. They do not have roads, bridges. You name it, it has been destroyed. Somebody has to rebuild it. Guess who it is going to fall upon?

In my opinion, it will fall upon NATO, and NATO, of course, will look at the United States and say, look, really, you are a wealthy country. You really should pay for this. And part of it I think we should. I think we should help the refugees. I think we do have an obligation to help get that country on its feet. But I do not think that obligation extends to the percentage of 90 percent. I do not agree with that.

But let us take a look. If it remains at about that 90 percent, or we continue to carry the large, disproportionate burden of this, the costs of this action will exceed \$100 billion. I can tell the Members, we could do a lot with Medicare, we could do a lot with social security, we could do a lot with education with an extra \$100 billion.

I have addressed the humanitarian effort. I want to tonight acknowledge everyone from the Red Cross to the different religious organizations to all of the people throughout this country who have collection boxes at local grocery stores to send clothes and books and food to the refugees and to the innocent citizens that are involved in this conflict. That is what has made America great. That is what will continue to keep America great.

As strongly as I question the policy of military intervention, I feel that strong about humanitarian intervention. It is appropriate for us to be in there on a humanitarian effort. Our country can handle it. Our country can carry it out. Our country can put a lot of smiles on these refugees' faces. We can clothe them, we can feed them, and we can help them rebuild their country. But where our expertise will get the biggest return is not the military intervention but the humanitarian intervention.

During the discussions we have had, we hear a lot of people talk about or debate whether or not we should have ground troops. By listening to some of the government officials or by reading some of the articles in the media, we would think we could put ground troops in there tomorrow if we decided.

Let us talk about ground troops. First of all, it would be a huge mistake

for the United States to put in ground troops that were not of sufficient quantity and strength to expect a ground war over there. Going into Yugoslavia is not going to be like going into Iraq, where you have a flat desert where you can see your enemies for a long ways.

It is not like the Colorado mountains. My district is in the State of Colorado, but it is probably very much like the Blue Ridge mountains in Virginia. I have been over there. I have seen it. This is rugged territory. This is their home territory.

As I mentioned earlier, this is the birthplace of the Serbs' religion. This is not going to be an easy place to occupy. In order to do that, we cannot send in 28,000 troops and accomplish the job. If we send in 28,000, we will be grossly undermanned, we will take many, many casualties, and we will wish to God we had sent in three, four, or five times that amount of force.

In order for us to really sustain the kind of military ground operation that would be necessary, I would say that at a minimum we need to send in 100,000 ground troops, and probably, more likely than not, closer to 200,000 than 100,000.

Are we prepared to move those kinds of troops into Yugoslavia? Putting aside the political argument or the dispute whether or not they should be there, take a look at the logistical challenges that we face.

It is an immense project to move just a division, and a division, a light army division, has say 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers. What they call a heavy division contains about 17,000 troops, 17,000 in a heavy division and then 5,000 to 15,000 more troops in support facilities.

The equipment necessary to move a division would stretch 700 miles. If we put all of the equipment that is necessary to support a division bumper to bumper, we could probably run a line 700 miles. We have to move that equipment from the United States or from other military bases throughout the world into that region.

Take a look at how long it took to move the Apache helicopters over there. What did we have, 24 helicopters? It took a month, 6 weeks? It was not because we were reluctant to move them over there, it is because it took a lot of manpower, it took a lot of mechanical, logistical planning to get those 24 Apache helicopters over there. Take that factor and multiply it by several hundred, if you want to move a division. Just assume several divisions. We are going to have to put several divisions in place if we want to have a successful military intervention on the ground. We cannot ignore that.

Now, where do we stage it? This is a large staging operation to move that equipment over there. A lot of people say, let us go to Albania. Albania seems to be a logical location to put the equipment in. The difficulty is that

Albania is a very, very poor country. Their airport does not have radar. Their harbor does not have the capability for cranes to reach in and lift tanks out of ships. We cannot move all of this equipment by aircraft. It would take significant infrastructure placement in Albania for us to utilize that as a staging area.

The other countries are not very excited, and maybe Macedonia will come around, but the other countries are not very excited about the United States or NATO staging a military action out of their country.

So the number one problem we have is, aside from the political commitment or the commitment to put those troops in there in the first place, is logistically, where do we start? Where is headquarters? Who has the logistical capability to help us move that equipment from throughout the world, most of it coming from the United States of America, into that area, servicing that equipment, fueling that equipment, manning that equipment, and then dispersing that equipment where we need to have it dispersed for a successful ground operation? I think it would take several months for us to get that capability in place.

Now, once that is mentioned, keep in mind that we just do not have unlimited equipment in the United States. When we dedicate that type of equipment to support that large a ground force in this country, we have to get it from somewhere. Where do we get it from? We get it from other military bases, other U.S. military bases.

My point is this: We are diluting the military force in this country to address this particular problem. I do not agree with the policy, but let us just, for the sake of the argument, say that the policy is correct, so we move all of that equipment over there. We have to keep in mind what kind of dilution do we now have in Korea, for example? What kind of dilution do we have in the United States? Are we taking the very best equipment away from our main forces in the United States?

We know that the President has already called up the reserves, so we know that our military forces, our troop numbers, are being significantly diluted. The President asked for 30,000 more troops, 28,000 or 30,000 more. It is my opinion if we were to launch a massive ground invasion, which I think would be the safest route to go, if in fact we agree with ground troops in there, and I do not, and I do not agree with the policy, but if that decision were made, I think it is very realistic for us to expect that the President would have to call up draftees.

Is this country prepared to reengage in the draft? The draft is already in existence. As we know, 18-year-old males have to register for it. Is this administration, is this Congress, prepared to draft individuals to put that kind of

force in place in Yugoslavia while maintaining our strength in Korea, while maintaining our strength in the mainland United States, while maintaining our strength throughout the other areas in Europe?

That is a significant question for us to ask ourselves, what kind of dilution can we afford? Even if we want to go in there with ground forces, even if we think this cause justifies an American military action, we still must stand back and say, can we afford or to what extent can we afford to dilute our current military forces? That is an important question.

As we know, or maybe Members have not read in the newspapers, for the first time in I don't know how many years we no longer have a carrier in the Pacific arena. We moved that carrier. Orders were given to that carrier to move over to assist in this operation. That is dangerous.

Take a look at the deploying of our military forces. In my opinion, some of these cuts have gone way too deep. In my opinion, our military could not sustain, contrary to what the administration says to us, our military cannot sustain two simultaneous major actions at once. It could not do it because the military has been so downsized. Now, to further dilute it for this kind of action, even if it is a just action, we have to assess that responsibility and what the cost of doing that is.

I wanted to very quickly cover the members of NATO. We have Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, one of the new members, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

Let me say, in that list of NATO members, they are all well-intended. I am not sure that our fellow partners, as I mentioned earlier, are carrying their fair share, but I will say that, for example, the United Kingdom, I think they have been tremendous. I think proportionately they are probably carrying their fair share.

But some of these other NATO members are going to have to step up to the plate. In my opinion, the United States of America is going to begin to question this policy more and more, especially when they see lives of American soldiers, we lost two of them last night, when that begins to become unproportionate, and even one death in my opinion is unproportionate; when they begin to see, the American taxpayers, what these tax dollars are costing, when they begin to see what the dilution is to our current military, I think some serious questions are going to be asked: What are the other members of NATO going to carry? What is their burden? What is their responsibility?

NATO, remember, was formed as a defense alliance. This is not a defensive

action. Some people will say it is to defend a spread throughout the European continent. I do not think it is, I think it is an offensive action.

But nonetheless, we are there. How do we resolve this conflict? What do we do to get out of this conflict? Well, we are in it. While we are in it, I think we have an obligation to support our troops with the best equipment we can possibly get over to them. Granted, it dilutes us. We have to keep a very keen eye on how to work that. But as long as we have one American soldier over there, we have to make sure they are properly equipped and we support the troops. We may disagree with the policy, but we have to give the support to those troops.

I think at some point Russia is going to play a key part in bringing a cease-fire to this situation over there. It is my opinion that Russia was not involved in the earlier stages to the extent that Russia should be involved.

Why do we say Russia? I know there is a lot of resentment or a lot of ill will towards Russia. Some people will say, they are by-gones, they are minute players in this. They are just the player we need, in my opinion, to bring a cease-fire. They have credibility with the Serbs, they have some credibility with the United States, they have credibility with the United Nations, and they have some credibility with members of NATO.

Russia may just be the player at the right time and in the right place to bring this thing to a cease-fire. I think what will eventually happen is that the air war, which apparently right now is being stepped up, and I can say that, while I disagree with the policy of being there, while we are there, we might as well carry out the mission that the President has sent those troops over there for.

So while this is going on, the sustained bombing, I think Russia will eventually, through negotiations that could be going on right now, bring us to a cease-fire. But there are several elements of that cease-fire that are going to be necessary to carry it out.

One, there is going to be a huge, a huge financial obligation put on the members of NATO, primarily the United States, one, to help bail Russia out of its economic problems; and two, to rebuild Kosovo, and to rebuild the infrastructure and put an economy in place that will sustain that country.

□ 2245

So that is where I think this action is heading. I do not think this conflict will spread like Vietnam spread, but I hope I do not later eat my words.

By the way, speaking of Vietnam, I want to say to all of my colleagues, that some people have said to those of us who question the policy of putting ground troops in Kosovo, who question the policy of the United States' extent

of military involvement, they say to us, look, any kind of action outside our boundaries, we must speak as one voice; do not dare question the administration's policies.

We have an obligation to question a policy if we in our heart do not think that policy is right, and that is exactly what I intend to continue on doing. Granted, outside our borders we are a very strong country, and within our borders we are a very strong country. But what makes us as strong as we are is that we have the checks and balances in this country; that we are free to speak, to question authority. And that is exactly what has made us as strong as we are.

Now, the wild card we have to worry about is if this bombing continues and if Russia is ignored. And to the administration's credit, I do not think they are ignoring Russia. I think the administration and NATO, and, frankly, NATO got in way over its head as far as the refugees were concerned. They never expected these refugees to come over, they never expected to have problems with balance of power in the countries which these refugees go into. NATO did not know what to do with them.

I think NATO is looking for a way out. And I think the administration is treating Russia with respect, and I give the administration credit for that. But we have to be very tender with Russia, because at some point Russia may say, all right, we are going to go ahead and sail Russian oil tankers through our so-called oil blockades. And what will NATO do? What NATO will do is they will not stop that ship. If Russia decides they are going to start supplying the Serbs with weapons or, worse, they are going to put a few Russian troops in Belgrade and say, do not bomb Belgrade any more, Mr. President, that is the wild card of Russia.

That is why I emphasized that Russia is an important player. They may not have the military significance that they used to have, they may not be the threat from a ground force standpoint or from an operating naval standpoint that they used to be, although clearly maybe they are even more of a threat from a nuclear capability because of our concern of an accidental launch, but they still have all those missiles, so they are a player. It is appropriate to get them right in the middle of this.

I want to talk for a moment and then I will wrap it up. I know I have gone on for a while here, but I have because I feel so deeply about this, but I want to talk about the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA.

In 1998, remember this is 1999, in 1998 the United States State Department listed the Kosovo Liberation Army on the international terrorist list. It is amazing to see the spin that is being put on these people in this Kosovo Liberation Army.

Remember that the latest flareup started when the KLA, that is what we will call them, the KLA started sniping and assassinating Serb police officers. So the Serbs, in a typical over-response, started shooting innocent civilians. The KLA in our country would be known as terrorists. Our State Department defined them as terrorists a year ago. But take a look at what is happening on the spin. All of a sudden the KLA are no longer terrorists, now they are being known as rebels or as freedom fighters.

The Washington Times this week, I think in Monday's publication, did a detailed article about how the Kosovo Liberation Army is running a heroin operation, the selling of drugs, to finance their military goals. We are about to jump in bed with these folks. We have taken sides with these folks. We have to be very, very careful before we hold hands with a partner like the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Let me wrap it up, because I would like to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON).

My summary will be this: Number one, what is the policy of the United States? What are the national interests that require our investment, require our commitment in this country? What is the history of Yugoslavia? Is it a Civil War, is it a genocide? We should ask ourselves what is the authority, what is the precedent we are setting out there? Are our European partners carrying their responsibility? Are they carrying a fair share of the burden? Are we supporting an organization that, in fact, are drug dealers, the Kosovo Liberation Army; that is, in fact, guilty of the same atrocities or many of the same atrocities as the Yugoslavian troops? And if we are, how do we make that distinction?

Of great importance to this country: Are we diluting our military forces to an extent that we are putting our country in danger of another military risk because we have shifted these assets too much in this direction? How will the conflict end? What role should Russia play?

Mr. Speaker, this is a very serious conflict. We lost two American soldiers last night. They died. We have a lot of decisions to make. This is a very serious situation for each and every one of us, and the final test, before I yield to the gentleman, the final test is could any one of us, as an elected official, as a government authority, knock on the door of a family and say to the father, the mother, or the spouse or the children, say to them that their loved one lost their life in this conflict and that the loss of their life was necessary for the national interests of this country?

If my colleagues cannot now answer that question in the affirmative, then they ought to be questioning this policy the same way I do.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON).

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague for yielding to me, and I thank him for his efforts on behalf of the understanding of the situation in Kosovo. I would add that I think I have some pretty provocative answers to the questions he raised, and I think we have good news on the horizon, perhaps as soon as the coming days, if not tomorrow.

Let me first of all start out, Mr. Speaker, by saying that we have been calling for Russia's involvement in the Balkan crisis in Kosovo for about 5 weeks. It was 5 weeks ago that I was first approached by Russian leaders from the Duma who asked me to open new channels with the administration to see if we could find some common ground for a solution to this crisis. I got information from them, I started working with the National Security Council, the White House, Leon Fuerth's office, the State Department, as well as Democrat Members of Congress so that no one could say we were doing something in a partisan way.

Those discussions and faxes went back and forth for about 3 weeks, and they culminated 2 weeks ago in a request by the Russians for me to bring a delegation to Budapest and then to travel down to Belgrade to jointly meet with Milosevic to convince him that he should, in fact, come to terms with the requirements that NATO has laid down.

I asked the Russians to put that request in writing, Mr. Speaker. They did that. I asked them to meet five specific requests that I had. The first was to put the request in writing for us to be involved, the second was to identify the Russian leadership that would be involved in discussions with us. The third was to give me a date and time certain for a meeting with Milosevic. The fourth was to meet with our POWs. We had not met with them yet. And the fifth was to travel with me to a refugee camp where they could see the devastation caused by Milosevic. The Russians agreed to all five points. They put it in writing.

We then went to the State Department, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. STENY HOYER) and I, a week ago this past Thursday. We met for an hour and a half with Strobe Talbott. We explained the opportunity. We said we were prepared to take a bipartisan delegation to Budapest and then down to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic. The State Department said, please don't go.

We were rebuffed by the State Department, but they did open the door for us to meet in a neutral city with the leadership of the Russian Duma. With that being said, over the weekend I continued discussions with the Russians and suggested that they pick a city and that on Friday of last week we

meet in that city and discuss the issue to see if we could find common ground.

The Russians decided that Vienna would be that city. I sent a letter to all 435 Members of the House a week ago Monday outlining in three pages what we had done, and I invited Members to join with us. Eleven Members came forward, 6 Republicans and 5 Democrats, from liberals like the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. BERNARD SANDERS) to conservatives like the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. JOSEPH PITTS) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. ROSCOE BARTLETT).

The 11 of us left on Thursday night, Mr. Speaker, and we traveled all night by air. We arrived in Vienna on Friday morning. We immediately went into meetings with the President of the Austrian Parliament to get a feel for what he thought should occur as an independent nation. And then, Mr. Speaker, we started meeting with the Russians.

We started in the afternoon, went into the evening, continued over dinner, and came back Saturday morning. And during our discussions with the Russian leadership, which included the broad basis of Russia's political spectrum, Russia has 7 major political parties and 90 percent of those political factions were represented in our discussions. The leader was Vladimir Ryshkov, who was the First Deputy Speaker and Chairman of Chernomyrdin's party. He was in direct contact with Victor Chernomyrdin throughout our discussion. We had Vladimir Luhkin, the former Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., who represents the Yabloko faction. We also had the third ranking Communist in the State Duma, Alexander Shapanov, representing Seleznyov and the Communists, as well as the region and Agrarian members of the Duma.

Ninety percent of the leadership in Russia's political spectrum was represented in our discussions with the 11 Members of Congress. But also, Mr. Speaker, we had two Serbs there. We had the largest financial contributor to Milosevic, who sat through our meetings as an adviser to the Russians in our discussions. Dragomir Karic, whose family, in fact, owns a significant amount of business interests in both Serbia and Russia sat through the meetings and kept in phone contact with Milosevic himself.

Now, Mr. Speaker, these meetings were not to negotiate. Our purpose in going to Vienna was to see if we could find common ground on which negotiation could take place. We prepared a document and went through that document line by line. During the time of going through that document, Mr. Speaker, both the representative of Milosevic and the Russians were asking our delegation to travel to Belgrade, because they thought there was an opportunity for us to bring at least one of

the POWs out, perhaps two of the POWs, as well as to meet with Milosevic and to get him to accept the report that we were working on.

Mr. Speaker, at 1 o'clock on Saturday, this past Saturday, we reached agreement with the Russians; an historical agreement. The Russians agreed to a multinational peacekeeping force that had weapons. The Russians agreed to have Milosevic remove the Serbs from Kosovo. The Russians agreed that we use the term ethnic cleansing. And even though the Russians agreed, and we still did not have the support of Milosevic, they took the document we signed and faxed it to Milosevic at 1:30 on Saturday afternoon.

Milosevic responded if we were to go to Belgrade he would publicly embrace the framework of our agreement and would, in fact, support what we and the Russians came up with. We then called the State Department. I talked to the head of NIS Affairs, Russian Affairs, Steve Sestanovich, told him about the offer that was being made to us, he had Tom Pickering, the Under Secretary of State, call me back. I read our document to each of them.

Pickering told me that he did not think it was advisable that we go to Belgrade, even though I told him that Milosevic's representative and the Russians were telling us that if we went we would bring out all three of our POWs; and if we went, Milosevic would publicly embrace the document that we had agreed to.

Mr. Speaker, that was 2 p.m. on Saturday. When we told the Russians and Milosevic's rep that we could not go because our government did not trust Milosevic, and after one of our Democrat Members had talked to Podesta in the White House, I told the Russians and I told the representative of Milosevic that we would not travel to Belgrade. That was at 2 p.m., Mr. Speaker.

In fact, in that telephone conversation from Pickering, he said this to me: "Why do you think that Milosevic would be open and candid with you and live up to what he is telling you about giving you the three POWs and agreeing to the document that you have in fact signed with the Russians?" He said, "After all, there have been other attempts to free the hostages. In fact, the mission being held by Jesse Jackson right now has been a failure. Milosevic has decided he will not give the POWs to Jesse Jackson's mission."

That was at 2 p.m., Mr. Speaker. We told them we would not go. And 2½ hours later the Milosevic government announced on CNN that they would release the hostages to the Jackson delegation within a matter of 3 or 4 hours.

Mr. Speaker, those are the facts and the time lines. We have reached agreement with Russia, and that agreement with Russia is very close to what Milosevic will accept. Now we must

push this document, as we are doing. We sent copies to the Pope, the head of the Muslim faith, the head of the Orthodox religion, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, the parliamentary leaders of every other country, as well as Ukraine and Russia, and tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, there will be an announcement.

The announcement that I predict will occur tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, is that Russia and NATO will announce that they have reached agreement on a multinational force; the beginning of the end of the conflict, partly because of the work of this Congress and people like my colleague and people on the other side like the gentleman who is going to speak next, who have been talking about the need to end this bombing, to end this hostility that is causing us problems with Russia and look for a way to solve this crisis peacefully.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the document signed by the members of the Russian Duma and by the Members of Congress who were in attendance at the meetings I referred to earlier.

REPORT OF THE MEETINGS OF THE U.S. CONGRESS AND RUSSIAN DUMA, VIENNA, AUSTRIA, 30 APRIL-1 MAY, 1999

All sessions centered on the Balkan crisis. Agreement was found on the following points:

I. The Balkan crisis, including ethnic cleansing and terrorism, is one of the most serious challenges to international security since World War II.

II. Both sides agree that this crisis creates serious threats to global and regional security and may undermine efforts against non-proliferation.

III. This crisis increases the threat of further human and ecological catastrophes, as evidenced by the growing refugee problem, and creates obstacles to further development of constructive Russian-American relations.

IV. The humanitarian crisis will not be solved by bombing. A diplomatic solution to the problem is preferable to the alternative of military escalation.

Taking the above into account, the sides consider it necessary to implement the following emergency measures as soon as possible, preferably within the next week. Implementation of these emergency measures will create the climate necessary to settle the political questions.

1. We call on the interested parties to find practical measures for a parallel solution to three tasks, without regard to sequence: the stopping of NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, withdrawal of Serbian armed forces from Kosovo, and the cessation of the military activities of the KLA. This should be accomplished through a series of confidence building measures, which should include but should not be limited to:

a. The release of all prisoners of war.
b. The voluntary repatriation of all refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations. NATO would be responsible for policing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders with Albania and Macedonia to ensure that weapons do not enter the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the returning refugees or at a later time.

c. Agreement on the composition of the armed international forces which would administer Kosovo after the Serbian withdraw. The composition of the group should be decided by a consensus agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership of Kosovo.

d. The above group would be supplemented by the monitoring activities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

e. The Russian Duma and U.S. Congress will use all possibilities at their disposal in order to successfully move ahead the process of resolving the situation in Yugoslavia on the basis of stopping the violence and atrocities.

2. We recognize the basic principles of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which include:

a. wide autonomy for Kosovo
b. a multi-ethnic population
c. treatment of all Yugoslavia peoples in accordance with international norms

3. We support efforts to provide international assistance to rebuild destroyed homes of refugees and other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to victims in Kosovo.

4. We, as members of the Duma and Congress, commit to active participation as follows:

Issue a Joint U.S. Congress-Russian Duma report of our meetings in Vienna. Concrete suggestions for future action will be issued as soon as possible.

Delegations will agree on timelines for accomplishment of above tasks.

Delegations will brief their respective legislatures and governments on outcome of the Vienna meetings and agreed upon proposals.

Delegations will prepare a joint resolution, based on their report, to be considered simultaneously in the Congress and Duma.

Delegations agree to continue a working group dialogue between Congress and the Duma in agreed upon places.

Delegations agree that Duma deputies will visit refugee camps and Members of Congress will visit the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Members of Congress:

_____, Neil Abernethy, Jim Saxton, Bernie Sanders, Roscoe Bartlett, Corrine Brown, Jim Gibbons, Maurice Hinchey, Joseph R. Pitts, Don Sherwood, Dennis J. Kucinich.

Duma Deputies:

_____, _____, _____, _____.

□ 2300

KOSOVO

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OSE). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from California (Mr. SHERMAN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) for his hard work. It did not just start recently. He has been building bridges between the United States Congress and the Russian Duma for many years. And I think he speaks well of the need for us to break out of this stranglehold that our policy is in where it seems like not